Abstract---The purpose of the paper is to define how the sociopolitical thought of J. Habermas – his theory of communicative action and the concept of deliberative democracy – guarantees the protection and keeping of an independent human personality in modern information societies. To solve this problem, the author seeks to determine what is meant by a “personality”. Analyzing this issue, the author distinguishes two different understandings of a personality among J. Habermas’s works: philosophical-personalistic and public-sociological. When integrating these understandings, the author gives an original socio-philosophical definition of a personality, in which the personality retains both individualistic and social traits. It is especially emphasized that for the affirmation of the personality and his/her development, equal, subject-subject dialogue with Others is necessary. The paper reveals that the development of personality, first of all, is interrelated with the maintenance of a cultural, normative, and valuable “life-world”, which is violated by the mechanisms of systematic technocratic regulation in modern times, in a society. The principles of this regulation are justified in a system-functional approach. The advantages of J. Habermas’s approach, capable of ensuring the development of a genuine normative essence of personality, are determined.

Keywords---deliberative democracy, J. Habermas, personality, phenomenology, life-world, theory communicative action.

Introduction

In the social sciences, the problem of violation of personality development, his/her alienation from the true “I” by modern social structures constructing norms is especially significant. So, there is an acute problem of tense relations between the multilateral life, freedom, and independence of the human personality, on the one hand, and the growth of technocratic power to the
management of society, objectively alienating concerning the personality, on the other hand, in postindustrial societies. In social, humanitarian studies, in philosophy, different directions that oppositely define the essence of the personality, his/her place and role in a society, the determination of his/her norms and values are provided. Thus, representatives of phenomenology study the subjective nature of individual meanings, personally experienced by an individual or intersubjectively—by a social group. But in post-structuralism, the opposite radical conclusion that the “historically determined” nature of a person can disappear as a “face traced on coastal sand” (Foucault, 1994) is made. Jürgen Habermas also developed in detail the problem of preserving the human personality in the relationship of its philosophical, social, and political aspects and proposed an original approach to its solution.

Therefore, the purpose of the study is to determine how, under the modern technocratic governance of post-industrial societies, namely, in J. Habermas’s approach, the problem of protecting and preserving a worthy, free, and independent human personality is being solved. It is undoubtedly the sociopolitical thought of J. Habermas was analyzed in detail by many domestic and foreign scientists (Linde, 2017). But we believe that the purpose of this study is to determine how to substantiate the protection of the human personality using J. Habermas’s approach, whether it is sufficiently original and whether it was previously posed by other scholars.

**Identification of personality in J. Habermas’s approach**

It is important that Habermas, even in his early work, analyzed the threat of the destruction of an independent personality, his/her consciousness, and the cultural “life-world” in post-industrial societies and proposed provisions for his/her retention and protection. Now, we need to determine the personality based on J. Habermas’s approach and we will follow this definition throughout our work. We believe that among the entire scholar’s works, in his multifaceted teaching, J. Habermas distinguishes two interconnected understandings of personality – philosophical-personalistic and public-sociological ones – at the normative-theoretical level.

J. Habermas presents a philosophical approach in “The Concept of Individuality” in the following principles:

- He criticizes metaphysical approaches in which the “universals” of objects do not allow individual objects to manifest themselves in their “selfness”, singularity, and uniqueness. For example, the universal of chairs does not allow an individual chair to be more than “unity”, as well as “individual,” therefore, he understands the essence of the personality “through an appeal to the concept of the subject’s selfness” (Abels, 1998). Habermas believes that each personality has his/her own substantiality “as an undoubted and indispensable personality” (Abels, 1998), in a society.

- The original essence of a person’s personality and a personal affirmation of his/her selflessness are impossible without the context of “ensuring the identity of the pictures of the world and moral values” (Habermas, 1984), – sincerely experienced, consciously accepted values and beliefs.
• But Habermas postulates the importance of the dialogical rather than monologic development of personality, studying the “relationship between individuality and intersubjectivity” (Abels, 1998). Therefore, public dialogue is especially important when the selfness of the personality is performatively protected in communication “upon reaching understanding” (Abels, 1998).

• Also, the “selfness” of a personality is better revealed when a person himself/herself performs performative linguistic self-determination, and not when he/she is determined from the outside by statements about him/her as a socially programmed individual.

Thus, under this approach, a personality is defined as an individual, unique entity that enters into dialogical interaction with other personalities. Therefore, J. Habermas gives a philosophical-personalistic definition of personality here. In the second approach, the personality is analyzed about the life-world, which is presented in the Theory of Communicative Action. In this understanding, the personality is analyzed at another, social level of measurement. Here, the personality is defined about the processes of “cultural continuation, social integration, and socialization”, taking place in the life-world (Habermas, 1984). Here, the personality helps the process of socialization, due to the development of people as personalities, “abilities... for dialogue and action, which allows achieving mutual understanding” (Habermas, 1984). But the reproduction of natural socialization serves not only the community between people, the development of dialogue between personalities, but also the fact that the personality dialogically “asserts his/her own identity” (Habermas, 1984), in society.

The personality formation must be also carried out through dialogical interaction, as well as in J.-G. Mead’s approach. The personality finally asserts himself/herself in a dialogical understanding on the part of others and mutually asserts others as personalities. This indicates the integration of the principles of symbolic interactionism, phenomenological sociology by Habermas into his original approach. Now, based on these two understandings, we will try to give a single normative definition of personality, original in his/her essence, but following the approaches of J. Habermas. Personality is a transcendental entity with his/her independent consciousness and which experiencing existentially significant meanings, values, preferences in it, unique in his/her individuality, dialogically approved by the other, and affirming the other as a unique personality (Ramos et al., 2021; Xiu & Xeauyin, 2018).

Now, let's analyze the problems associated with the development of personality in information societies. So, in modern information societies, a violation of the integrity of the personality occurs, with the mechanical introduction of meanings, norms, and values artificially constructed by the administration, programmed into consciousness through the media system, mass culture, mechanical ideology into the sphere of the life-world of the constituent personality, ensuring his/her “integrity” (Timofeyeva, 2009). Reproduction of the natural norms and values of the personality is violated, and the independent human consciousness is subordinated to purposeful flows of the programmed information, and standardization is applied to direct human communication, connecting it to the systems of capital and power.
These problems can lead to the destruction of the meaningfulness of human life—the basis of human existence: “the main threat of lack of meaning..., the main nightmare, plunging the individual into a world of disorder, meaningless, and madness” (Wiener, 1994). Therefore, Habermas is developing a “positive” project to counteract the systems of manipulating influence and to protect the sphere of the normative-value “life-world”. Phenomenological sociology must prove that human consciousness by its nature is not a constructed product of existing structures (power, linguistic, etc.), external conditions, one-sided information, but it has a sovereign meaning.

According to the founder of phenomenology Husserl (1970), a person’s cognition of reality is preceded by a subjectively existing “life-world” for him/her: a set of people’s direct ideas about themselves, the world around them, not objectively given, but subjective norms, values, religious preferences formed in everyday life experience. A person perceives reality through the “prism” of the values of the life-world, and these norms and values do not depend on “scientific statements” (Gellner, 2004). The life-world exists subjectively for the personality and intersubjectively for various social groups in society. Literature read during life, accepted religious, spiritual beliefs, and other conscious things enrich the life-world of the personality, therefore, society becomes not unified, monotonous, but pluralistic.

Garffinkel (1967), developed the ideas of phenomenology in practice and in the course of his experiments he proved that a person always acts meaningfully, proceeding from some deep meaning in his/her life and his/her perception of reality. A person takes personal social (and political) action based on common sense (Parsons, 1993). It is with his/her own, personal interpretation that a person intelligently constructs and “constitutes” his/her vision of social reality: “We cannot stand if the world is out of order. Social reality is constructed by us in such a way that it produces meaning” (Nazarchuk, 2009). As we believe, therefore, due to the establishment of personal meaningfulness of the action, Garffinkel refuted and overcame the definition of the system approach that an individual’s personal (even sincere) action always “occurs by common norms and values” (Nazarchuk, 2009), defined by the cybernetic system. This is important for Habermas to justify his approach to communication and to the idea of achieving consensus (Easton, 1966). But the system approach (presented by Parsons, Easton, Luhmann, etc.) inherently involves the following problem. As will be proved, its representatives purposefully exclude the independent personality as an independent variable in the analysis. This is manifested in the following:

**Suppression of a free, independent personality in a cybernetic system**

R. Meadow proves that the theory of systems is based on cybernetics, “it is associated with the concept of social control” (Luhmann, 2001). This led to the use of a precise scientific approach to the study of society, a special understanding of society as a “system”. Thus, in cybernetics, N. Wiener proposed the scientific and technical concept of a “self-reproducing system”, adopted in social theory by Parsons to analyze society as a whole. The “system” is being defined as follows: in a mechanistic technique or a natural individual organism at a higher level of development, the elements add up to a general system that has
the property of emergence – the irreducibility of the state and new properties of the formed system about the properties of its elements. Therefore, the processes in the system are combined into a common, consistent, “synergistic activity” (From critical theory to the theory of communicative action..., 2001), gradually forming into “one organ” (From critical theory to the theory of communicative action..., 2001). But it is obvious that a society that is still at an early stage of development and more complex, post-industrial societies cannot be defined as just a kind of unified biosystem or as the life of an anthill system (Pacherie, 2008; Dillard & Yuthas, 2006).

So, in the system analysis of society, understood as an emergent set of elements in joint, consistent activity, the role of the individual is not precisely defined. Presumably, the personality will be understood only as an element of the general system, which contradicts both the philosophical, personal principles of personalism and the principles of the democratic ideal. Rather, such a systematic approach will lead to a technocratic, authoritarian control of society, which also indicates the need to develop another theoretical approach (Salvaggio, 1983; Janson et al., 1993).

**Leveling the subjectivity of the independent consciousness of the personality, the senses he/she experiences, and their functionalization by the cybernetic system**

Since the system approach is methodologically determined by the exact sciences – mathematics and cybernetics, which presuppose an abstract-quantitative methodology; it has the problem of a qualitative study of the individual consciousness of a personality and the semantic level of community life, understanding human communication as a message of meanings. In the extreme development of the system approach, human consciousness is defined only as a function, a means of communication through which information is transmitted to reproduce the system. An example of such a “programmable” individual is the “modular man” conceptualized by Gellner. It is interconnected with the growth of spheres of the economy, depending on the mobility of society – “the interchangeability of members”. This is possible when:

- Standardization of ways of perceiving messages, a single codified culture that denies all “semantic conventions that narrow the possibilities of transmitting messages regardless of the addressee and circumstances” is being developed (Habermas 2000).
- The meaning of the message is reduced and formatted as much as possible.
- A person is perceived not as a personality, but as an element in a mechanism, a conductor of systemic information.

So, under the system approach, all social communication is controlled, since a person should be included in the overall functional activity of the system for the development of its integrity: “communicative processes can operate effectively only under the condition of strict cybernetic control” (Dostoyevsky, 2017), on the part of institutional structures. Luhmann writes that consciousness is only a tool for conveying the meanings determined by systemic communication, a mediator, “a medium for communication” (Habermas & Luhman, 1971). On the contrary, in
other sociological theories, it is noted: each person has an individual semantic perception of reality, values determined by him/her and personally shared by the values of the social group and society as a whole. But in adapting systems theory in political science, Easton argued that the political subsystem is “a set of interactions through which values are brought into society in an authoritarian way” (Schmitt, 2010), therefore, values primarily serve to legitimize power. Thus, in contrast to phenomenology, communication serves not to communicate the true meanings of citizens and society but to indoctrinate values, norms, constructed from outside and determined by the state apparatus. Moreover, Luhmann writes that there is no initial, ideal meaning; it is affirmed by the system as a functional product of its operations, which use and define the meaning.

Luhmann argues that in information societies in all subsystems of society, the process of technization is predetermined – the spread of social technology, which determines the “increase in efficiency” (Held, 2014). Large quantitative, but not qualitative efficiency is manifested in the “unloading” of consciousness, “unloading the sense-forming processes of experience and action..., schematization of processes that initially occur in a random form” (Held, 2014). But along with technicalization – the development of technical and formal means of communication and the quantitative intensification of information processes in societies – the significance and subjectivity of human consciousness is lost, its qualitative semantic component becomes impoverished and simplified, and the everyday cultural and semantic sphere of the lifeworld is disrupted. Technocratic cybernetic coding of meanings assumes that “technology takes the form of automation when processing information, excluding their broader meaning from consciousness during operations” (Held, 2014). Consequently, as a result of technization, the deep, semantic basis of the interaction of people in society is violated, the very life of a person and the whole society is standardized and primitivized.

Gradually, this leads to the “reification of the communicative practice of everyday life” (Habermas, 1984), therefore, the life-world of the personality, social groups is violated due to the technical legitimation of power based on system programming and emotional suggestion of new meanings into a person. As a whole, the theory of systems, based on the methodology of cybernetic control, allows the state apparatus, using political technology, to program citizens with the meanings of activity constructed by administrators and to create a formed image of the surrounding reality (Wiener, 1988). As a result of programming, coding of consciousness with artificial meanings, a person is alienated from his/her selfness, from nature at the level of personality, and “violation of collective identity in society” (Habermas, 1984), at the group level. Thus, under the system approach, in which Easton and Parsons believed that norms and values serve primarily to legitimize power, Luhmann argues that the initial subjective norms and perceptions of citizens can be changed, technicalized, subordinated to the system logic in the interests of the political system. Therefore, Habermas defines the technicalization of the true life world as a significant threat to the unfree, directed development of societies. This prevents the development of a free, not programmed system of personality (Berger, 2011; Suryasa et al., 2019).
Proposal of a “Solipsic” closed system of technocratic control, striving for the sole definition of reality

Technocratic, systemic control of society is dangerous because it is aimed at the gradual denial of the human personality. Habermas shows that the technization of the life-world is associated with the excessive dissemination of instrumental rationality in societies, its subordination to the principles of all areas of human activity, from the standpoint of “the value of a calculation of a technical nature” (Wiener, 1988). In form, instrumental rationality relates to the development of positivism, establishing itself in the exact scientific planning of its activities and the regulation of the activities of subordinates. In terms of content, it comes from “Protestant ethics”: actions are aimed at achieving purely their interest, they are regulated by “codes” of success and efficiency. But even Weber singled out its negative sides: the technical and instrumental regulation of life determines as insignificant and, therefore, does not give expression to people’s own cultural, religious value ideas about life (Putnam, 1991; Gurven et al., 2014).

Instrumental rationality is based on empirical knowledge of reality, asserting itself due to informational possession of the surrounding world, adaptation to its conditions. So, the instrumental action is based only on the subject’s perception of reality, therefore it is monologically. It is aimed exclusively at achieving its goal, “influencing the opponent's understanding of the situation” (Kovachich, 2017). Habermas criticizes the rational-bureaucratic nature of modern countries. The state bureaucratic apparatus manages the entire society, according to the principles of instrumental rationality, which leads to a technical violation of the life-world, “communicatively structured spheres of life are subordinated to the imperatives of independent, formally organized systems of action” (Nazarchuk, 2009). This endangers the existence of democracy, freedom, and equality of citizens. Outside of criticism, the subsystems of administrative technocratic power become “self-referential” – self-describing, autopoietic – self-reproducing system without the influence of the surrounding world, not subject to public opinion.

Since the state apparatus, about the exact scientific methodology of managing society, sets the goal of a technical transformation of reality, it does not need a mutual understanding of “acting subjects who practically want to master their social relations” (Wiener, 1988). As a result, to maintain the existing order and to solve managerial problems, humans and his/her activities become the subject of rational management (Althusser, 2006), only as a “material..., but people, like natural objects, are forced to countable behavior” (Wiener, 1988). On the contrary, in Habermas’s approach, it is the concept of the subject that precedes further social analysis: “Habermas considers the subject as an already previous subjectivity as the potential of truth substantiation” (Present Western philosophy. Encyclopedic Dictionar, 2009) from the side of the personality. Luhmann, on the contrary, excludes even the possibility of the concept of personality as subjectivity, as the potential of the possibility of human mutual understanding. Luhmann levels the subject to the side effect of technical “decision-making capabilities” (Timofeyeva, 2009), and selectivity of system selection. It is the system that is primary in its origin. Thus, eventually, in Luhmann’s approach, only the “system” is real, which relates everything else, but: the surrounding
world, social relations, the subject entering into them and its consciousness are only produced and dependent variables that have accidentally arisen due to the absence of any other choice of the administrative system. The system “choice from the discovered alternatives is a problem that relatives all the others” (Timofeyeva, 2009), and therefore, the personality itself should be defined not as an eternally existing “thing in itself”, but only as a momentary “contingent selectivity” (Present Western philosophy. Encyclopedic Dictionar, 2009).

Thus, the essence of the personality does not have a transcendental character, but it is constructed by the system. Although in Luhmann’s approach the system is impersonal and formalized, “communication communicates itself”, we believe that there should be decision-makers, “demiurges” in every system. It is the demiurge of the system that sets the norms and values, pre-sets the essence of the personality, and seeks to reproduce it, according to a model that is comprehended “from above” (Shutz, 1994). It should be noted that this approach contradicts both the basic spiritual values of Christianity and world religions, as well as the key postulates of the Enlightenment, and carries a serious anti-humanistic potential that denies the subjectivity of man.

Therefore, Habermas’s approach, asserting the preservation of the semantic, value-normative foundations of the existence of a personality in their diversity, aimed at the emancipation of human consciousness and opposed to the negative process of bureaucratic management, acquires special significance (Jaeger, 2005; Zu, 2021; Yoon, 2005). Wiener criticized the cybernetic approach in social sciences and argued that its application in administration leads to a cybernetic-technocratic model of social control. The scientist has identified the danger of such a political technique being used by a separate group to “dominate the rest of the human race; political leaders may try to rule the people through political technology..., the weakness of the machine... cannot yet take into account the area of probability that characterizes the human situation. The dominance of the machine presupposes a society where the statistical differences between individuals are equal to zero” (Habermas, 2001). This approach leads to the technocratic power of the administration, calculating the methods of control over the entire society, “which is anti-democratic” (Linde, 2017).

Thus, the state apparatus, guided by the cybernetic-system approach, not only does not take into account but, by its logic, tends to exclude the individual from the sociopolitical process. From our point of view, an example of such a cybernetic regulation of the life of an individual in society is the Internet – the “social credit system” in China. It prescribes the norms of all social actions to people and assesses their activities in real-time using large flows of information – Big data, coming from various sources: large corporations, state security services, personal “denunciations”, etc. (Cukier et al., 2014). Therefore, there is a threat to the implementation of the system of cybernetic system control in practice. Consequently, another scientific approach, with the help of which it is possible to preserve democracy in its true, original form, to articulate public opinion, and to preserve the independence of human consciousness, his/her cultural, semantic life-world, is needed. Habermas also seeks to meet this challenge (Canfield et al., 2015; Hummel, 2012).
Disclosure of the “Selfness” of the personality through the articulation of the values and meanings of his/her own life-world

Habermas, in contrast to the system-functional approach, studies people’s subjective ideas, but also, unlike phenomenological sociology, he takes into account the manipulative influence of “power” structures external to the individual, determines the way of preserving the sovereign “life-world” of social groups while overcoming this technical impact. This is realized in his theory of communicative action, which includes “a two-level concept of society, which connects the paradigms of the “life-world” and the “system” (Nazarchuk, 2009). Let us illustrate this in comparison with the post-structuralist approach. We believe that there are two main approaches to overcoming the principles of system-structuralist approaches. The first is the original “critical theory” of Habermas’s society for analyzing the direct social interaction of citizens and their life-world, using an understanding hermeneutic-phenomenological methodology and analytical philosophy of a language. The second approach is defined in poststructuralism, but it involves the following problem.

Poststructuralism is based both on the system-structuralist notion that the consciousness, action, and interactions of people are determined from the outside by general social structures and on the excellent conviction that these structures are not naturally reproducible in origin, but purposefully constructed from the outside for the management and programming of society. Therefore, in poststructuralism, this leads to the “negative” idea of complete rejection or destruction of these structures—structures of language, gender, social structures. But, as we believe, in the aggregate, the recognition of the absolutizing role of structures, when combined them with the idea of their destruction, can lead to a violation of natural human nature, life-forming social relations, an original culture, to an unrecoverable catastrophe, when human nature itself can disappear inscribed on the coastal sand” (Foucault, 1994). What is needed is a “positive” project. Then Habermas’s approach, who defended the independent role of the personality and social groups in history, the independence of the consciousness of the personality, the ability of citizens to make a conscious personal choice guiding the political process, outside the administration of structures, acquires special significance.

At the same time, Habermas’s approach is fundamentally different from the principles of Marx’s. We consider the point of view of many representatives of the social sciences that K. Marx also laid the foundation for structuralism in the social sciences. This point of view was substantiated by representatives of “structuralistic Marxism”, such as L. Althusser, N. Poulantzas, and others. Thus, Marx proceeded from certain integrity that determines the consciousness of individuals—class, productive forces, formation, etc., but not from “human nature (or the essence of man)” (Volgin, 2016). The personality-subject was determined through economic determination, the interrelation of the “base” with the “superstructure”, which meant the postulation of the personality, “the subject as a derived function of objective structures” (Forchtner, 2010). Thus, these principles reincarnate the structuralistic Marxist approach at a fundamental theoretical level from emancipatory in orientation to anti-humanist in its essence. This point of view was also represented by L. Althusser in the paper Marxism and
Humanism and others. The Marxist approach denies that there is a “universal human essence” (Volgin, 2016), correlating with each of the “selected individuals” (Volgin, 2016). This theoretical understanding in practice leads to the fact that “Marxist... politics is possible... if it... is based on Marxist philosophy, the precondition of which is theoretical antihumanism” (Volgin, 2016). Perhaps this theoretical thesis of the predominance of the whole over the particular became the basis for the domination of the State over “deviating” social groups in “Stalinist practice” (Easton, 1966).

In contrast to Marx, Habermas denies materialistic determinism and shifts the emphasis to the study of the spiritual side of society. Indeed, J. Habermas writes that “these processes of reproduction include symbolic structures of the life-world. We should separate from them the technical reproduction of the maintenance of the life-world” (Habermas, 1984), for society. This contradicts the basic principles of Marx, who based the life of society on the material development of the technical component of the economy—the productive forces. It also includes: 1. meanings personally experienced by people; 2. types of thinking characteristic for different people, groups – instrumental, communicative rationality; 3. types of instrumental action, communicative interaction of people, etc., depending on the types of thinking.

The life-world is especially important for emancipation, the selfness of the personality, the foundations of his/her existence, his/her spiritual essence, since it is, at the same time, the basis for the constitution of the culture of the personality, groups and it is personally constructed by them. Therefore, Habermas studies the communication of the “everyday life-world, in which the structures of rationality are embodied and the processes of reification are found” (Habermas, 1984). The goals of preserving the existence and re-creation of the life-world correspond to an independent, daily, joint social activity, not forced structurally, but based on human mutual understanding.

The achievement of Habermas, in contrast to Hobbes, Schmitt, who saw the basis of society as a struggle, is that he revealed that it is mutual understanding that is the basis of everyday social action, human direct interaction, forming the fabric of social life. Consequently, mutual understanding, interaction, and their development are the basis for the existence of society, the most important social spheres: “cultural reproduction, social integration, and socialization” of people (Easton, 1966), family, education, etc. It is a mutual understanding that revitalizes the existence and reproduction of these spheres of society. The free development of communicative rationality in society serves to achieve and to maintain mutual understanding between different social groups. It is affirmed not only at the expense of its own benefit, but through mutual understanding, consistency, and consensus between people. In communicative action, actors strive to achieve a goal, but with mutual agreement, equality, mutual understanding, a desire to accept the point of view of the Other, the existence of an agreement in which the subjects pursue their goals, therefore, the dialogical nature of the action is affirmed.

Humanity is also realized in the fact that communication serves mutual understanding when the Other “is perceived not as an organism, but as a person”
In communication, mutual understanding is established between people with different views of the world, “equal respect for everyone extends to the personality of another in otherness” (Habermas, 1992). But at the same time, the principles of communicative action presuppose the preservation of the reverse side of mutual understanding, when “each person recognizes in the other his/her autonomy” (Abels, 1998). Mutual understanding is achieved not through forced system integration external to individuals, but through direct, interpersonal communication.

In the course of the discussion, not only the personal, but also the intersubjective meaning of the action becomes clear, which became common after the exchange of points of view, which presupposes reaching a consensus. Consensus is enriched by the perception of different points of view; it is not set forever, but can be reasonably revised at the right time. Thus, communicative action allows citizens to navigate consensus and to justify the policy development direction.

**Overcoming the automation of human consciousness and the technicalization of his/her life-world by discussing political problems in the “Public Sphere”**

Habermas believes that it is necessary to develop certain principles of political communication (Habermas et al., 2011), the democratic structure of society that meet the following tasks for the development of the humanistic aspects of society:

1. subjective acceptance in the minds of people of humanistic communicative rationality and communicative action;
2. overcoming the introduction of mechanically structured technocratic subsystems into the intersubjective consciousness of society;
3. development of political communication as an organized dialogical understanding;
4. building democracy as an understanding of one’s ideas, preferences of citizens and their articulation at the level of state power. This means a conscious clarification of the normative values and ideals of the “good” life of the personality, society, as well as the dialogical development of these normative ideals.

Habermas develops the principles of discussion in the model of “ideal speech situation”, due to which it is possible to achieve a genuine, not imposed from the outside consensus:

- All citizens can start a discourse on problematic public issues and continue it.
- They have equal opportunities to substantiate their points of view or to refute others.
- They are truthful about their “inner world”, “their attitudes, feelings, and intentions” (Wiener, 1988).
- Structures do not affect the point of view, discourse: position, influence of citizens, the meaning of the argument itself are taken into account.

With the help of these principles, democratic values are provided in dialogical communication: expression of one’s own point of view of a person’s “I”, perception of others; in the discourse, the external introduction and influence of the administrative and economic subsystems are overcome.
For the most compelling arguments to be taken into account and a rational conclusion to be formed, all the statements of the participants should satisfy the “claims to significance”:

- Verity in relation to the outside world.
- Fairness with respect to social norms.
- Truthfulness regarding the subjective experiences of the personality in the inner world.
- Statements should be grammatically correct and clear for the interlocutors.

Habermas identified the difficulties of realizing the model of the “ideal speech situation”. We believe that there can be two directions for implementation:

- Critical research: critical discourse analysis reveals deviations in the existing political communication from the normative principles of “claims to significance” (Habermas, 2005; Fishkin & Luskin, 2005).
- Positive-practical: development of new formal and informal institutions of democratic political communication and public policy based on the model.

The conductor of communicative rationality and democratic communication is the “public sphere” – the sphere of society in which the free formation of public opinion takes place, legitimate power (Fishkin, 2009), is determined in communication, and the solution of social problems is possible. Restoring mutual understanding ensures the self-organization of civil society, which supports democracy.

To do this, Habermas defines the criteria for the formation of an independent rational public opinion:

- In the public, the number of those expressing a point of view coincides with the “receiving” information. Communication is dialogical, everyone can express and listen, the agenda is not determined by “opinion leaders” through the media.
- In communication, it is possible to immediately and effectively respond to public points of view.
- Public opinion, rationally, reasonedly formed in the discussion, is realized in a rational, positive action, even if it contradicts the principles established by the “dominant system of power relations”.
- The authorities do not put pressure on the public, which is more or less independent in conducting discussions.

**Formation of the deliberative democracy concept, which serves to articulate the true meanings and different perceptions of reality by citizens themselves for the benefit of the whole society**

Therefore, Habermas develops the theory of the social contract: the state system should be rationally discussed and determined by the entire society. The theory of communicative action provides the communicative basis for Habermas’s concept of deliberate democracy (from English deliberate ‘discuss, ponder’). The concept
proposes to expand the power of civil society and its influence on state power through a rational discussion procedure, informed, not affected by the system.

But Habermas does not deny the importance of representative power, “only the political system can ‘act’”. But the projects of power should be mediated by public discussion: “the communicative structures of the public sphere shape a network of elements that respond to the pressure of social problems and stimulate influential opinions”. A universal, rational political discourse is capable of engaging all stakeholders; it obeys the power of argumentation and not economic, political coercion, and therefore, leads not to the achievement of personal interests of power groups, but to an understanding of the common good of society, its achievement. Political communication does not originate from a single source in the administrative power but is shaped during discussions in civil society.

The differentiation of the system and the life-world, its rationalization are also important from the following point of view. Guided by a systematic approach, the state authorities strive to create a certain type of society, citizen, and person, corresponding to a socialist or liberal order, to reproduce the existing political system. Habermas argues that due to deliberative democracy, on the contrary, society itself develops and the freedom of the individual is revealed. Since all social groups can present their value, normative ideas about the community’s life together, they can defend their point of view in public discussion.

Therefore, in contrast to technocratic control, the domination of the state apparatus over the personality in the cybernetic approach, it is the personal human “I” and the intersubjectively realized “we” of the social group that precede the creation of state institutions, determine the understanding of their essence in Habermas’ approach. In a deliberative democracy, people overcome the sphere of constructed system-mechanical relationships among themselves and develop free and direct relationships. These relationships are moral in nature since they are based on the moral agreement of being together. This agreement is based on the values of the Enlightenment; it also develops the humanistic spiritual values of world religions, with the development of which it became possible to restore the “moral idea of equal respect for every person”. For moral development, “resonating world religions can be carriers of ‘truth content’ in the sense of suppressed or unused moral intuitions” of society. And the norms and values of living together freely defined by people can be articulated at the level of the state apparatus and formally institutionalized in the text of the Constitution.

So, Habermas shares the actually existing norms of law and the importance that citizens themselves put into the norms of the community. Therefore, drafts of the necessary changes in law should arise and be worked out at the level of discussions of the civil society itself. It is not only the specific norms of law that have been developed at the moment that are important, but also the opportunity to discuss their significance, to rethink it in democratic debates. This also affects the discussion of the “normative content of constitutional principles”, when the Constitution is viewed as a developed draft. This allows removing the problem in the law, overcoming the alienation of legislation about citizens, the discrepancy of laws to personal, existentially experienced values, norms, and meeting the
requirements of the time. Citizens feel personally influenced by laws that are passed that can solve pressing problems of the public.

The assertion of an original, spiritually-post-secularist version of contractualism in Habermas's later writings can overcome the problems in a democracy: alienation of the state power from society, the artificiality of existing state structures, rejection by society, and unnatural norms and values constructed by the authorities. For this, it is also necessary to transfer the true norms and values of society to the national level. Thus, in deliberative democracy, norms and ideas are not proclaimed by the ruling management elite and they are not embedded in the consciousness of a person. And this approach is also being implemented in reality. Thus, deliberative discussions of citizens have been conducted under the leadership of the Stanford Center for Deliberative Democracy of J. Fishkin. For a week, with an equal sample of 1,000 people, a discussion is held between citizens on significant political issues. Discussion includes two votes: on the first day of discussions – a vote reflecting the early, non-reflective opinion of citizens, and on the last day – a vote reflecting the developed, more “reflective” and rationalized opinions of people. These forums for discussing problems have demonstrated that the opinions of the parties to the discussion are changing, becoming more reflexive, thoughtful, depending on normative rather than “emotional” criteria, and there is not polarization between the discussants, but rapprochement on various issues (Sanjaya Adi Putra & Dwirandra, 2019; Suputra & Widhiyani, 2020).

The following aspect is also important for personalities. In any society, there is alienation between people, which is also supported by a monologic approach to communication and to the promotion of their points of view. And consequently, the development of the fundamental basis of the personality is ensured in dialogue – alienation between people is overcome through the mutual dialogical confirmation of each other as full-fledged, unique personalities. This is also served by the institutionalization of public dialogue in deliberative democracy. Therefore, due to the exchange of views, understanding, and acceptance of each other’s deep feelings, people really “overcome apathy, disunity, inattention, and the initial lack of information”. People can freely perceive norms, values, discuss them, and better understand personal and other ideas through mutual recognition of each other in dialogue. It also promotes the development of a free, independent personality. Thus, J. Habermas’s normative approach solves, from our point of view, the main task of the humanistically oriented social sciences – it reflects the analyzed threats of technocratic anti-personal management of society, and then a person can always remain a person.

**Conclusions**

Let us draw the main conclusions from this study:

- Habermas’s sociopolitical approach, in contrast to phenomenological sociology, also studies the logic of system functioning, which is introduced into the spheres of the life-world and offers ways to overcome cybernetic-system control.
Contrary to the system-functional approach, which theoretically substantiates the technocratic management of society, Habermas defends the importance and independence of the personality, different social groups and their life-world. The use of communicative rationality and communicative action overcomes the “instrumental rationalization” of society. Owing to their implementation in the spheres of public life, the structures of the life-world are preserved and rationalized.

Rationalization of the “life-world” is ensured in the use of the principles of communicative rationality in sociopolitical communication. Communication is ensured by the existence of an independent “public sphere” and it should be carried out by the principles of the “ideal speech situation”. Due to this, it becomes impossible to “technize” the life-world, and there is an articulation of their own, not imposed, values and ideas of citizens and their further transmission to the state power. This protects the original sovereignty, the consciousness of the individual, protected from manipulation by the state and economic subsystems.

Therefore, with the development of an independent “public sphere”, free political communication becomes the center of Habermas’s concept of deliberative democracy. The use of this concept ensures overcoming the destruction of the human personality under the model of authoritarian technocratic control, protects its freedom and independent consciousness.

Consequently, Habermas’s approach ensures keeping the original essence of the human personality based in the deep structures of his/her cultural, value-based life-world.

Thus, the preservation of the human personality and the protection of its freedom, independence, due to the protection of his/her cultural life-world, are possible in information societies precisely with the practical implementation of the principles of J. Habermas’s approach.

References


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