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Scientific Knowledge as a Means and a Prerequisite for Discovering the Essential Powers of the Individual

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Abstract---Using historical-philosophical and historical-cultural material, the authors substantiate the idea that the heuristic potential of knowledge is enhanced by an in-depth analysis of its philosophical foundations. In the process of analysing knowledge in various philosophical traditions, the authors reach an activistic conception of knowledge, which includes freedom as a prerequisite for external and internal human activity. Knowledge doesn't coincide with the absolute measurement of freedom and at the same time with the factuality of phenomenal being. It realizes itself at the point of unity of these considerations. By analyzing the sensual, empirical, and theoretical measurement of knowledge, the authors conclude that knowledge, as well as its structure, should be considered in a broad methodological and philosophical way, including the dialectic of knowledge and ignorance. Knowledge is related to the system of human activity. This system includes the object, subject, purpose and objectives of study. But the activity system also relates to nature of the operations performed. This nature is connected with the soul of a person, their inner world. The latter has to do with personal knowledge, latent knowledge. The purpose of the study is to analyze scientific knowledge as a prerequisite for discovering the essential powers of the individual.

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Introduction

Human societies, reflecting on historically first forms of knowledge, have noticed long ago that there is deeply personal knowledge, which cannot be made public. Otherwise, there can be an upheaval of social foundations. The discussion on the understanding of scientific knowledge revolves around the issue of the correlation between the spirit and the system of knowledge formation. Spirit is a part of the essential forces of human personality and means self-consciousness as the synthesis of all moral forces. The system of knowledge, on the contrary, constrains the spirit. It inhibits the development of the heuristic potential of knowledge. In other words, systematicity does not always contribute to achieving the scientificity of the knowledge obtained. It is for this reason that the authors of this study proceed not only from the pursuit of systematicity per se and spiritual being. The authors also suggest that scientific knowledge is not at the point of phenomenological existence and not of purely theoretical being, but at the point of unity of both. In other words, the contradiction between spirit and system is resolved in the postulation of universal human values. They overcome the inhibition of the cognitive process, in which the spiritual and the purely intellectual, theoretical and systematic can absorb each other (Cevallos et al., 2020; Nyandra et al., 2018).

The relevance of the study of knowledge as the most important condition and prerequisite for human external and internal freedom is related to the consideration of information of social significance, i.e. when it comes to the awareness of the social consequences of human decisions in the complex modern world. But knowledge, after all, is not limited to information. A person can know, be fully aware of the consequences of their actions, but at the same time commit dysfunctional actions, deviations of various kinds. If information is not about analysing the interaction between the elements of knowledge, then knowledge is about analysing the links between the elements, the facts of revealing personal potential.

The method of the present study is to reveal the essence of knowledge in the context of the connection between the cultural synthesis of modernity and historical thinking, the self-organization of knowledge as spiritual integrity; with an analysis of the nature of knowledge, based on freedom as a prerequisite for the human external and internal activity. This is necessary because the world and a person's place in it are learned through the knowledge of the soul (Aristotle, 1976). And the human soul is the prerequisite for spirituality and freedom. There is no soulfulness and no genuine spirituality, and thus no basis for the scientific management of social processes.

Materials and Methods

Modern social science and the humanities have developed different approaches to unlocking the essence of knowledge (Barnes, 2008; Bloor, 1991; Chisholm, 1989;

Ichikawa, 2011; Fascia, 2014; Kusch, 1999; Latour & Woolgar, 1979; Nagel, 2013; Popper, 1989; Reichenbach, 1938; Lemos, 2020; Kusch, 2000). Before examining knowledge as a condition of human freedom, and eventually as a prerequisite for the formation of social freedom, it is necessary to analyse the existing approaches to defining the essence of knowledge, to distinguish it from scientific knowledge, its inherent systematic nature, the aspiration to develop a certain universal scientific method. Plato considered knowledge "as a recollection", as a recollection of "what was before the birth of the human being" (Plato, 1993). A human soul becomes enveloped by the body, and the person forgets what he or she knew before, in another life. This is a methodologically productive position, but it creates an orientation towards contemplation rather than activity. The knowledge does not belong to the one who knows. A person cannot just consume it. In this respect, it is not the person who possesses the knowledge, but the knowledge that possesses the person. Otherwise, one becomes an application to knowledge, which turns into information, where there is no dialectical interconnection between the elements of knowledge as a productive system. A person loses their independence and freedom as critical reason, the ability to think critically and understand the world, disappears from their space of existence. However, a fundamental characteristics of knowledge is aimed at the comprehension of human nature - to be socially and spiritually active, but not in the sense of external vanity, but in the sense that people themselves have an inner, creative productivity. In spiritual-practical terms, this capacity of the individual means the possibility of constant renewal, the growth of his or her spiritual, creative forces, the desire to overcome the isolation of one's own self, in which many "selves" interact, from the world and oneself (Bloch, 1963). The researchers, while studying the dependence of cognitive processes on social life (e.g. on the production mode, historical era, power structure), at the same time interpreted the link between cognition and social structures in different ways, considering it as causal, functional and symbolic.

Results and Discussion

Not everyone is immediately capable of adequately grasping certain fundamental ideas, principles, and values. The problem lies not only in the fact that personal knowledge is made dependent on the subject's abilities and the characteristics of intellectual cognitive activity. This knowledge acts as latent knowledge. One could argue that knowledge is always explicit. If one deals with a fact of knowledge, it can be expressed verbally. This would be true if the socio-cultural context of knowledge were absent. Information, in contrast to knowledge, is characterized by relaxed interaction between the elements of the system. Knowledge has a socio-cultural component. Cognitive activity is transferred, mastered through communication. Some of the unique knowledge cannot be transmitted due to the physical death of its bearer. Humans create theories that do not simply act as reflections of existing economic and social conditions, but reproduce them as spiritual, theoretical beings. In the case of considering thinking as a social process, the subject's free activity is destroyed and alienation is introduced into cognitive activity. According to K. Marx, people in the social production of their lives enter into certain, necessary, independent of their will relations and thus at the same time produce certain perceptions corresponding to their state, according to which they then define their social identity (Marx & Engels 1959). This thought

can be interpreted in the sense that the actual production process itself takes place in consciousness, i.e. through the production of perceptions. However, considering the impact of thinking on cognitive activity involves considering not only the real forces that set consciousness in motion, but also the study of thinking as a social phenomenon.

It is most productive to begin the study of the knowledge issue not by considering the relationship between the individual subject and the external world, but by investigating the relationship between inter-subjective links and nature. Man-made things embody knowledge and specific ways of communicating. One can reflect on the issue that these forms of communication do not exist in the minds of individuals, but somewhere within them, in the field of their actual interactions (Lektorsky, 1995). It should be noted that as long as researchers focus on the social determinants of ideology, illusions, myths and moral norms, a sociology of knowledge and scientific knowledge itself cannot emerge. The sociology of knowledge emerges with the signalling hypothesis that even truths are meant to be socially responsible. And this means that truths must be related to historical society (Merton & Merton , 1968).

An analysis of science and its genesis is required in order to find a solution to the issue of thinking. In the study of science it is necessary to proceed precisely from society, societal and group needs, the human existence, and the analysis of the tensions that often arise between thinking and social life. The relationship between them should not be taken for granted, but as correlated with different historical periods, various cultures. Massive communities reject individual values. On the contrary, members of the scientific community are guided by particular, private values and considerations when they make scientific decisions. Scholars who share common values may nevertheless make different choices in the same particular situation. This is where the following factors come into play. In many situations, different values dictate different conclusions and lead to different choices. In such cases of value conflict (e.g. when one theory may be simpler and another one more accurate), the relative weight of the various values among different individuals can play a decisive role in individual choices. Although scientists share these values and are expected to act accordingly, not all of them apply the values in the same way if science is to survive (Mokshitsky, 1991).

Any society, regardless of whether it is a primitive clan system, an agricultural community, an industrial or post-industrial organisation or an information society, is a system of social interactions between people, i.e. a social system. All the social relations that make up this system are conditioned by the material basis of society, they exist and are reproduced in the process of activity. Social relations determine the orientation of an activity, its nature, and its specific socio-historical form. Different kinds of knowledge are necessary for the functioning and development of social systems. These are data about the natural and socio-cultural environment; knowledge about the ways of action; various forms of reflection of social relations required to enable people to live together. What all of these types of knowledge have in common is their correlation with the basic conditions of the social system (Camisón & Forés, 2010; Putra et al., 2020).

The social system is connected to the productive forces (the human being is the main productive force), which modify the system of property relations and management. Changes in the system of social relations determine changes in the spiritual culture of society. The development of productive forces affects the development of society as a whole. The relations connected with the formation of collective property determine the predominance of collective management of the reproduction of material and spiritual goods over personal interests. Scientific knowledge becomes possible at a sufficiently high level of the productive forces' establishment. Collective creativity is developed through the division of labour. This division is related to the destruction of primitive communities. However, it is linked to the formation of economic activity. Even magic among primitive people was stepped in the productive activity of the community (Parker, 2013; Flynn & Goldsmith, 1999).

No social system can exist without knowledge. Therefore, one can conclude that knowledge is essential to the livelihood process of any social system. Knowledge is integrated as an essential component of it. Reproduction of a social system entails the preservation and growth of the information necessary for its functioning. Therefore, in the course of history, the mechanisms for its production and transmission have developed. In this respect, any social system has an informational or cognitive aspect. It is as necessary for society as the production of material goods. However, in the early stages of human history, cognition was organically linked to the language of real material and spiritual life of people. It is not yet isolated as a separate component of the social system, i.e. as a relatively independent social formation. In the course of subsequent development, this separation takes place and knowledge is presented as the final product of this differentiation. The significance of knowledge for the social system lies in the fact that it provides qualitatively new opportunities for the practical activities of people (precisely in the areas of its application). Knowledge enables acting in accordance with the essential properties of the objective world, and thereby ensures the achievement of the desired results and ultimately improves the practice itself. In general theoretical terms, the genesis of knowledge can be defined as the process of separating from the cognitive aspect of the social system its relatively independent component, oriented towards the production and reproduction of socio-cultural and scientific knowledge (Gans et al., 2017; Gokalp, 2012).

A systemic approach to analysing the various aspects of the genesis of modern knowledge allows the authors to argue that, over the centuries, a new social system based on machine production has been developing, leading to the emergence of industrial society. Capitalist profit eliminated obstacles to economic growth and at the same time stimulated factors that strengthened the dynamic nature of the social system. However, this dynamism has been associated with an increase in technocratic trends in life oriented towards purely quantitative indicators. Scientific knowledge was formed as one of the elements of the social system. But knowledge sociology was not just a sociological version of the history of ideas, but an attempt to investigate systematically the social and cultural situation of different knowledge forms, considering their genesis in the context of specific social structural elements. The sociology of knowledge does not investigate the truth of ideas, but their social function, examining the relation of the individual to social groups and interests. Truth and fallacy are certain forms

of thinking that are socially conditioned (Swingewood, 1984). Although there was no individual personality in the primitive community, members of the community nevertheless competed for a greater share of social wealth. This struggle has to do with the human desire to be existentially self-reliant. The harmony of interests between members of the community, although based on a desire to insist on the priority of the common interest, people gradually increased the social distance without which there can be no individual personality. The morality of primitive people is different from that of civilised people. A primitive man could not choose between good and evil. The conflict of opposing desires in the individual's soul is a prerequisite for the individual to find himself or herself in a situation of moral choice. Scientific knowledge, as not only a system of moral, legal and aesthetic values, but also as an existential individual constantly overcoming conflicts, leads to the problem of overcoming authoritarian and individual management of social activity. A person who is guided by an understanding of scientific knowledge dominated by the normative component of foresight enters directly into society. An individual in a civilized information society, relying on the evaluation of the decisions made, distances himself or herself from the violation of moral standards. If the normative component of prediction is suppressed by a narrowly pragmatic and technocratic spirit focused on purely quantitative performance indicators, there is a violation of moral standards. With economic and social stratification, people are constantly faced with a choice between good and evil. The existence of modern human being takes on a tragic nature. However, modern people strive to overcome the state of being at variance with their knowledge, which basically means agreeing with their essential powers (Kosasih et al., 2021; Siegel et al., 2004).

At the same time, the essential powers are connected to the development of the productive forces and production relations. But people tend to reproduce the old relations of production by inertia, even though the new productive forces have, to a greater or lesser extent, already displaced the old relations. Industrial relations are connected to the moral spirit. This spirit is contained in the power of collectivism. The spirit of collectivism is central in the transition process to civilisation. However, productive forces lag behind production relations. The productive forces of society are related to the quality of people's lives. And this quality can be provided by science, which is aimed at shaping the products of creative, innovative activity. These products are consumed by people in an almost ready-made form, without adding anything of their own. On the contrary, scientific knowledge, as a prerequisite for revealing the essential powers of the individual, is associated with the addition of new knowledge. Scientific knowledge is a professional and civilised art that aims to shape the mental culture of consumers of spiritual products. This art aims to express the lives of spiritual product consumers. And this life is created by themselves in the course of the increasing role of social and cultural work in social and cultural life. Scientific activity also motivates artistic creation. However, the information society is characterised by an ambitious spirit. Scientific knowledge detaches itself from any civilisational mythology. This knowledge is oppositional to supernatural beings, which have a pronounced personality. Scientific knowledge is nevertheless organised into hierarchical structures resembling the structure of the state apparatus (Griffen et al., 2021; Ryan, 2020).

In the process of transforming society towards civilisation, people had to create a complex social system, based on the system of production relations itself, before they could develop their productive forces. This system of relations is determined by the development of the society's productive forces, the types of human activity, the areas of life, the forms of human consciousness and subconsciousness. Production relations are the basis of society as a whole. This basis is built on the productive forces of society. Such an understanding of the society structure not only adequately reflects the actual situation, but is also fruitful for scientific forecasting of societal development. It is necessary to identify the trends in the development of the productive forces and to substantiate the trends in the development of the society itself. These trends are related to overcoming the technocratic approach to planning consciousness and action. Information transfer also occurs between animals. The management exists if the information is conveyed by people who consciously plan their activities. Computers and networks are involved in the management process because people use them. Management involves not only organisation, but also the self-organisation of people. In industrial society there was a depersonalization of creativity, i.e. the identity of the consumers of spiritual products with the producers was realised. In the information society, this situation is gradually eroding. There is only an imitation of professional spiritual activity in the information society. The reason for this lies not only in the erosion of collective relations but also in the spiritual world of the individual as a single subject of creativity (Shtulman & Valcarcel, 2012; Raymond et al., 2010).

This is the objective social side of the knowledge genesis. But this process also has a subjective side, which is linked to the formation of theoretical and epistemological preconditions for the emergence and formation of scientific knowledge. The analysis of this side of the intellectual process should reveal how and why the impact of objective conditions has certain consequences in the context of moving towards the formation of theoretical knowledge of great complexity. The authors believe that modern knowledge could not have arisen by chance from the encounter between rational thought and experiment. The experiment and theoretical, systematic thinking, firstly, had to emerge historically and, secondly, their encounter will only be fruitful if certain socio-cultural, universal human conditions are present.

In order to understand the formation of modern knowledge, it is necessary to analyse in a socio-historical context the dynamics of cognitive processes that took place in the interval between the state of society, when consciousness and knowledge were still directly "embedded" in material activity, and the state in which objective and subjective preconditions and grounds for the emergence of modern scientific knowledge have developed. It is necessary to consider the social conditions, the presence of which makes it possible to achieve objective knowledge. In this regard, attention should be drawn to K. Marx's thought on the social determinacy of human consciousness. But it also creates the problem of understanding ideology. It is the idea of K. Marx that knowledge is an actively recreated social product. When K. Marx critically analysed the knowledge of bourgeois economists, his critique was based on the following ideological definition of knowledge: since bourgeois economics is the product of an interest in knowledge, nourished by the ruling class of capitalist society, this knowledge is

ideological, i.e. it is influenced by this interest and is adapted to it. This ideological component is inherent in the whole search for knowledge, but it is essential not to confuse it with a deliberate falsification or distortion of the truth. It is characteristic of ideology, however, that people are more often than not unaware of its presence. Each ruling class in society develops its own ideology, just as the system of thought and knowledge that competes with it also has components of ideology.

The new branch of knowledge is based on the "Strong Programme" methodology in the philosophy of scientific knowledge. K. Mannheim already distinguishes two important styles of thinking in the 19th century. The first ideology was related to the ideas of the Age of Enlightenment. K. Mannheim points to the principles of individualism, technological progress and universal reason. Another style of scientific thinking was "conservatism" (Stanley, 2005). The problem of philosophy of knowledge is explored in the close context of business organisations (Argote et al., 2000). The authors of this study take the position that the transfer of knowledge itself is quite rarely an unproblematic process.

Understanding the social specificity of knowledge, as opposed to the idea that knowledge is unambiguous, became a research subject of the second half of the 19th and early 20th centuries. Scientific knowledge was being justified and strengthened as an authority in public life, and science thereby acquired a strong charge of symbolic value as it came to be perceived as the most important way for modern society to make intellectual and moral progress. The adherents of the principle of historicism believed that the legitimate field of action for the "Spiritual Sciences" (Comte, 2011), was the search for and identification of historically unique, i.e. humanitarian (spiritual) manifestations. This orientation fitted well with the interest in cultural products and systematized knowledge that nascent sociology had. The studies of the German sociologists of cognition M. Scheler and K. Mannheim should be understood in the light of this historical setting.

According to M. Scheler, the relativism of knowledge sociology became a means of analysing its manifestations to get to the absolute and beyond the control of social factors knowledge, to the world of truth lying beyond the radius of empirical research activities. His reasoning is based on a distinction between, on the one hand, the "real factor"; and on the other hand, the "ideal factor", with the former determining the circumstances from which the latter later emerges, without affecting the content of thinking and knowledge. This means that the historical and social conditions under which thinking develops can be attributed to forms of cognition, while the content of knowledge is excluded from sociological analysis. Another focus of M. Scheler's scientific inquiry is his definition of what he calls a "relatively natural picture of the world", which is the way an individual perceives the surrounding world. Although this method seems perfectly natural and proper for an individual, in reality the knowledge required for a person to be able to perceive the world around them in a meaningful way is related to the position one holds in society. Thus, there are various worldviews (e.g. philosophical, cultural and legal). The logic of Scheler's reasoning is as follows: the ruling elite should develop a perspective that integrates these various worldviews and thereby attain the truth. According to M. Scheler, the vital values are secondary compared to the spiritual ones. Spiritual values are not fully consumed, but eternally assimilated.

All mental acts are necessarily sociologically conditioned by the structure of society (Scheler, 2012).

Unlike M. Scheler, in many respects in his theoretical constructions K. Mannheim proceeded from the position of K. Marx on the dependence of the system of ideas on the social, especially class conditionality of their proponents. K. Mannheim presented the sociology of knowledge as a theory of social or existential conditioning of thinking. All cognition and all ideas are localised, albeit in varying degrees, within a social structure or historical process. A particular social group may have more complete access to an understanding of the social phenomenon than other groups, but none of them may have absolute access to it. The ideas are rooted in different segments of historical time and social structure, therefore thinking is inevitably forward-looking (Osipov, 1993). K. Mannheim's methodology of knowledge research involves two stages. Firstly, he reduces the diverse ideas of modernity to several historical types according to the argument that ideological space tends to move from atomised diversity and competition to increasing uniformity. Secondly, each ideology is analysed as a function of a particular kind of social being and defined by changing structures of class and generation. Each of the ideologies is associated with a distinctive style of thinking and has its own answers to questions that are constitutive of public and individual consciousness. In his analysis of the ideology concept, K. Mannheim distinguishes between two aspects: partial ideology and holistic ideology. Partial ideology relates to the individual and operates on a psychological level. A holistic ideology relates to the ideology of a historical era, or the thought structure of a social group in a particular period, i.e. it is based on the supra-individual level and relates to the perceptions expressed at that level (Mannheim, 1952). A holistic ideology reflects a worldview that has a specific historical and socio-cultural context. K. Mannheim emphasises that this wholeness is not the sum of the separate, fragmentary experiences, nor can the individual encompass all the elements of wholeness. The scholar believes that Marxism set the concept of partial ideology in dependence on holistic ideology, and thus gave the concept of ideology this very meaning. But at the same time he believes that K. Marx's theory of history belongs to a bygone stage and that the next step should be made – to move from a theory of ideology to a sociology of cognition. This occurs, according to K. Mannheim, through the emergence of a general formulation of the concept of holistic ideology, whereby individual theories of ideology develop into a sociology of knowledge and cognition.

If knowledge is relative and depends on the position a social group occupies in society, on the historical and social environment, then it can be concluded that the cognitive-sociological analysis itself is not a manifestation of certain ideology, since it is relative in historical, cultural and social terms. Does the sociology of knowledge express only a worldview of a group of intellectuals, or is this view of the relationship between social forms and knowledge relevant regardless of time, place, social position? K. Mannheim argues that the diverging interests of different social groups due to their different positions in historical and social contexts determine their attitudes to formalised knowledge and its content. He believes that an integrative perspective can be developed based partly on understanding and preserving the cultural world of past history and partly on a position in modern society that enables a deep understanding of its dynamics,

based on a "relatively classless" and not overly fixed social existence. Those who occupy this position are intellectuals, or "free-floating intelligentsia". Since intellectuals represent a heterogeneous social group who, thanks to their education, acquire the ability to synthesise and criticise all other class interests, their point of view is above the other viewpoints and can compare them with each other and highlight all that is valuable in each of them. In this case, intellectuals do not have to develop attitudes to formalised knowledge, and thus to the associated specific class interests of other perspectives, or defend them. Understanding the fact of the social genesis of knowledge leads to a synthesis of the truths contained in ideologies by incorporating them into their genetic connections, making them unnecessary, displacing them with a new overarching vision (Kettler & Meja, 1995). However, there remains some inconsistency in K. Mannheim's theoretical constructs. This refers to the provision that the content of natural science and mathematical (logical) knowledge is excluded from cognitive-sociological analysis since it is not amenable to social interests.

Researchers today are in a situation where it is difficult to understand the underlying foundations of cognitive activity. Some authors note that the productivity of knowledge is gradually becoming an economic problem of the knowledge society rather than a humanitarian one (Drucker, 1995). Scientific knowledge as a prerequisite for discovering the essential powers of the individual is revealed in the theory of the "minimal state" (Nozick & Williams, 2014). This state is reduced to the function of protecting the individual from violence, deception and theft. The "minimal state" is therefore fair and appealing. Scientific knowledge aims to protect the "minimal state". But this protection is done spontaneously, by the action of an "invisible hand". The state in this sense is a spontaneously born social organism. Another theorist of democratic capitalism emphasises the fact that today the rich are getting over-wealthy and the poor are getting even poorer. Scientific knowledge under conditions of capitalism ceases to be economically active. Working people are far from equal in their talents, and good fortune does not follow everyone. The results of people's efforts to achieve spiritual and economic well-being cannot be equal. But nevertheless, the system of democratic capitalism is becoming a prerequisite for the economic activity of many people. This system contributes to the welfare of society as a whole, not just the workers (Novak, 1984).

In defining the nature of knowledge it is necessary to abandon an understanding of the latter as contemplation, vision, "for-self-being" (Hegel, 1977), etc. The definition of knowledge should be based on freedom as a prerequisite for external and internal human activity. It is clear that absolute freedom is an ideal that cannot be realised in our public and political life. But it should be strived for, without ever trying to achieve it completely. This is the transcendental setting of the problem of attaining freedom and knowledge as the being of freedom. Ultimately, human thinking in a capitalist society is self-contained. And ignorance is relegated to the periphery of philosophical and scientific inquiry. Meanwhile, it is knowledge that is ignorance. The nature of things and processes is difficult to comprehend. The only thing that can be achieved is "knowing ignorance" (Cusa, 1979). While in classical approaches ignorance is interpreted as imperfect knowledge, in modern post-classical and neo-classical science the discovery of ignorance is understood as a cognitive action that aims to set the boundaries of

possible creative work with already existing knowledge. But, nevertheless, ignorance is aimed at gaining new knowledge and is thus described in terms of existing knowledge. The possibility of developing knowledge, and thus the possibility of improving the external and internal life of the individual, arises only if external and internal freedom is not overlooked.

Conclusions

The conclusion of this study lies in the idea that living knowledge is related to reconstructing the thinking situation in which a particular knowledge was generated. Living knowledge aims to recover the way of thinking that led to the emergence of this knowledge. However, knowledge as such cannot act as a regulator of social interaction. It should not only be embodied in a goal, a programme of action, but also become the belief of an individual, of a social group. Only in this case, knowledge does not become a destructive force, but gains a new quality – a positive regulation of social activity. A fundamentally new attitude towards knowledge is required to be developed. But as the study results show, no knowledge can fully encompass the whole of reality. Thus, knowledge is not entirely dependent on the social and cultural environment, the historical era, the social status of the individual and the group. It acts as its carrier of knowledge. But this can be achieved on the condition that one considers integral consciousness. Consciousness has the capacity for self-constitution and self-determination. The heuristic potential of knowledge can be strengthened based on a more in-depth analysis of its philosophical foundations, which include the essential forces of the individual and human freedom.

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