How to Cite:

Shukurov, S. I. (2021). Geostrategic interests of turkey and Iran in the Caspian region. *Linguistics and Culture Review*, 5(S2), 764-773. https://doi.org/10.37028/lingcure.v5nS2.1418

Geostrategic Interests of Turkey and Iran in the Caspian Region

Sabir I. Shukurov

Azerbaijan University of Tourism and Management, Baku, Republic of Azerbaijan

Abstract---The relevance of this article is due to the advantageous geostrategical position of the Republic of Azerbaijan in the Caspian region, which makes it a significant and attractive location for neighbouring states both politically and economically, causing not only partnership relations between the countries but also the probable insecurity of Azerbaijan's territorial integrity. The purpose of this study is to examine and analyze the complex of geostrategic relations in the Caspian region on the example of the relationship of the Republic of Azerbaijan with the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. The leading method for the study of this topic is, first of all, a deep and detailed analysis of the geostrategic and geopolitically advantageous position of the Republic of Azerbaijan, as well as the method of comparing its relations with neighbouring states, which makes it possible to imagine as accurately as possible the general geopolitical picture of the Caspian region. The study demonstrates the importance of good partnerships between the Republic of Azerbaijan not only with Turkey, an ally that supports the territorial, economic, political, cultural integrity and independence of Azerbaijan but also with the Islamic Republic of Iran, relations with which are far from ideal due to a complex set of historical and political factors. Nevertheless, it can be argued that the cooperation of these two states has remained at a fairly high level for a long time, without going beyond the peaceful framework. This research will be useful for political scientists and historians.

Keywords---foreign policy, geopolitical position, geostrategy, natural resources, partnership.

Introduction

The geostrategic interests of large states and their political activities, based on this foundation, are a factor that has a significant impact on the geopolitical benefits of countries. The role of such states, influence and pressure on countries

Linguistics and Culture Review © 2021.

Corresponding author: Shukurov, S. I.; Email: shukurov6293@uoel.uk

Manuscript submitted: 18 April 2021, Manuscript revised: 27 June 2021, Accepted for publication: 28 July 2021

can be strong or weak depending on the importance of the region for them and the political processes taking place in it. In reality, it is impossible to prevent the impact of extraordinary circumstances on the regional geopolitical situation. For this reason, it is necessary to adapt the interests of the states of the region to the geopolitical interests of emergency situations (Tavana et al., 2012; Akbulaev & Bayramli, 2020).

The interests of large states in the region are formed in two main blocks: political and economic. The strategic interests of large states can be directed both to the region and to the country's position in the region. The economic interests of large states in the region consist of the region's natural resources, the country's transit opportunities, participation in the implementation of large-scale economic projects and large trade relations with the region, capital investments for such purposes, and so on. From the point of view of influence on politics, there are certain differences between these moments. The facts indicate that the economic interests of large states in most cases exceed political interests. A good example of this is the double standards clearly visible in the political positions of the United States, Russia, European states in relation to the Karabakh conflict, the Arab-Israeli confrontation, and so on (Kolosov & Mironenko, 2001).

Having studied the interests of the great powers in the region, the boundaries of interests and the balance of forces, interests, it is necessary to determine the basic principles of the foreign policy of such states in order to outline the contours of their political activity in the region. Such principles are formed based on political traditions or subjective factors of a pragmatic, ideological and imperialist nature. Knowing which principles are leading in politics allows predicting the policy of such a state as a whole.

Azerbaijan is a country with a thousand-year history and rich spiritual culture. At various stages of history, a rich cultural heritage was formed in it, which made the fundamental traditions of statehood and a great contribution to world culture. The location of Azerbaijan in a favourable geographic space and an abundance of natural resources led to the fact that it was constantly subjected to occupation policies by external forces. In particular, it is memorable that during the last two hundred years Azerbaijan was under the rule of the Russian Empire, as a result of which people were deprived of a number of vital advantages in history.

The presence of Azerbaijan within the empire or union did not allow it to establish all-round relations with world states. After gaining independence, the country has become one of the geopolitical centres actively integrated into the world. One of the goals of Azerbaijan's oil policy is to take into account the interests of the West (Orazgaliyev & Araral, 2019; Britchenko et al., 2018; de Jong, & Warmelink, 2017). The correct use of their interests and policies by involving strong states in the region creates the need to ensure the geopolitical interests of the country, to obtain detailed information about the interests and political activities of such states.

To study the contradictory processes that have occurred over the past 18 years with the country and region, it is necessary to pay attention to the geopolitical position of the geographic space, including the geopolitical interest of world

powers, large states in Azerbaijan. Geopolitics is based on geographic location and the human factor. For these two factors, it can be said that Azerbaijan occupies a very important geopolitical position. The following are the factors that characterise Azerbaijan's geopolitical strength:

- the Azerbaijan Republic, being a part of Eurasia, has dry territorial power;
- located on the sea coast:
- located in the Euro-Asian corridor;
- has rich natural resources;
- has a population with a high intellectual level, statehood with centuries-old historical traditions and rich material values.

The main factor determining the geopolitical strength of Azerbaijan is its location in a favourable geographic space. In classical and modern geopolitical theories, geographic location is considered as the main factor. As the main factor in the formation of an ethnos, people, the geographical location, natural environment are indicated, and the territory is considered the space of the national spirit.

Particular importance in geopolitics is given to the location of the country in the vicinity of the sea. The location of Azerbaijan on the sea coast significantly increases its geostrategic importance. The Caspian Sea is important for Azerbaijan in terms of military strategic security, trade, mineral and other resources. The location of the country on the seashore allows it to establish comprehensive cooperation with its closest neighbours. The geographical location of Azerbaijan stimulates the provision of the country with an important place in the geopolitical interests of large states of the near and far abroad. The Caspian region, with its geostrategic position, natural resources in the centre of attention of the world powers, was considered one of the important strongholds in the south of the empire even during the existence of the USSR. In this region, along with the Western states, Russia, the Turkish Republic and the Islamic Republic of Iran are pursuing an active policy (Le Billon, 2001; Hendriarto, 2021; Ibegbulem, 2021).

The Republic of Turkey as the closest strategic ally of the state of Azerbaijan

Two fraternal countries – Azerbaijan and the Republic of Turkey – bring together both geopolitical positional and historical roots, linguistic and cultural unity. After the restoration of the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, one of the main directions of its foreign policy was the establishment of multilateral close ties with the Turkic states. During this period, relations with Turkey have deepened and expanded even more. In official and business circles, Turkey has always had a special approach to Azerbaijan: at the meetings of the state and government levels, this attitude has been repeatedly emphasised. Among the five Turkic states that gained independence in the former Soviet Union, Azerbaijan is geographically the closest to Turkey and attaches great importance to it in foreign policy. Thus, the common culture, mutual understanding and respect have laid the foundation for relations of particular importance between the two states.

For the first time, the independence of Azerbaijan was recognised by Turkey on November 11, 1991, and since then, relations between the two countries have risen to the level of strategic alliance. The state of Turkey contributes to the expansion of international relations of Azerbaijan to strengthen its independence. Turkey is the country that supports Azerbaijan, which consistently condemns the aggressive policy of Armenia, not maintaining political, economic, diplomatic relations with it (Ibrayeva et al., 2017; Monshipouri, 2017; Rozin et al., 2017; Koo & Han, 2018). Armenia's foreign policy strategy is directed not only against Azerbaijan but also against Turkey. Azerbaijan occupies an important place in Turkey's geopolitical strategy. Currently, Turkey's policy with Azerbaijan is built in four directions, all of them are thought out and built in a careful way:

- relations are equal, mutually beneficial: they meet the political, economic, cultural, social and other interests of both states;
- relations between the two states are based on the principles of alliance: Turkey and Azerbaijan do not harm their relations with other states;
- Turkish-Azerbaijani relations do not infringe on the independent statehood of both countries: mutual respect for national attributes and values is maintained;
- states promote initiatives against each other in the international arena: support is expected in organisations and other organisations within the framework of international law (Ilhan, 2000).

First of all, Ankara, relying on its relations with Azerbaijan, wants to strengthen its positions in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey maintains ties with the Caucasus and Central Asia through Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan plays the role of a bridge with the Turkic republics of Central Asia. According to the Turkish researcher Suat Ilkhan: "The geopolitics of Azerbaijan lies between Turkey and the Turkic states." The geopolitical position of Azerbaijan in the Turkic world is very important for Turkey.

Azerbaijan plays an important role in ensuring Turkey's energy security. The implementation of the Baku-Tbilisi-Ceyhan oil pipeline not only increases Turkey's geopolitical importance but also satisfies its oil demand. It is known that the negative factor of geopolitics Turkey is a shortage of oil resources. It is from this point of view that the oil factor plays a special role in the development of relations between the two fraternal countries (Slack & Starr, 1997; Gylfason, 2001).

In the author's opinion, the basis of Turkey's policy aimed at the South Caucasus and Central Asia is to assist in ensuring the stability and security of these regions, to provide support for the independence, economic development and wellbeing of the countries of the region. After the collapse of the USSR, Turkey was the leader in the development of cooperation and solidarity between Azerbaijan and other Turkic-speaking countries of Central Asia, and provided Azerbaijan with high-level support. An important step for the implementation of efforts was the Cooperation Council of Turkic-speaking countries, created under the Nakhchivan Agreement, signed on October 2-3, 2009 during the IX summit of the heads of the Turkic-speaking countries, held in Azerbaijan. As part of such

efforts, there is great importance to the leading position of Azerbaijan, which opens the door for Turkey to Central Asia.

The supply of energy resources from the Caspian Basin to Western markets is one of the main areas of cooperation between Turkey, Azerbaijan and the countries of Central Asia. Turkey supports the most productive use of energy resources in the Caspian Sea, progress in delivering energy resources to Western markets, increasing independence, security and development of the countries in question. The implementation of the Trans-Anadolu Gas Pipeline (TANAP) project will also be important in further strengthening such cooperation. This important project suggests that Azerbaijan will fulfil its promise to sell its gas on the European market. Such a project once again testifies to the growth of the economic power of Azerbaijan. If in the early 1990s Turkish businessmen invested in Azerbaijan, now Azerbaijan plays an important role in the Turkish economy (Ibrayeva, 2018; Morozov, 2018; Burton, 2018). And this is an indicator that the strategic partnership between Turkey and Azerbaijan is becoming even more important. It is worth noting that the TANAP project raised the energy cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan to a new level in terms of quality.

The positive results of close cooperation between Turkey and Azerbaijan in this area, achieved both for countries and for the region, clearly indicate the reality of continued cooperation in the future. Along with its geographical proximity, the South Caucasus region, which represents the historical, human and cultural similarities, has an important place for Turkey's foreign policy. The Central Asian republics, which have historical closeness in origin, cultural and linguistic ties, also play an important role in terms of the foreign policy towards Eurasia.

The Turkish state regards Azerbaijan as a natural ally to maintain its influence in the Caucasus and Central Asia. Turkey is closely cooperating with Azerbaijan in all areas. Turkey's geostrategic interests in the region collide with factors from Russia and Iran. In the conditions of geopolitical contradictions noted in the region, Turkey pursues a policy as a strategic ally of the West. Ankara is interested in moving NATO eastward. Turkey plays a supporting role in the implementation of the US Eastern political strategy to expand its influence in the Caucasus. Turkish-Azerbaijani relations should also be approached within this context.

The author's researches show that Turkey views Azerbaijan as a geopolitical centre, playing the role of a "corridor-orderly" between Russia and Iran. Georgia also occupies an important place in Turkey's Caucasian geostrategy. Thus, the ongoing processes make the strategic alliance of Turkey, Georgia and Azerbaijan inevitable in the region. The emergence of this form of unity could neutralise the influence of Russia and Iran in the Caucasus. In recent years, the three states have signed important documents in the field of security and political and economic cooperation. Despite Turkey's geopolitical contradictions with Russia and Iran, Ankara is interested in improving relations with these states, primarily on economic grounds (Tuathail & Agnew, 1992; Bilgin, 2007).

Geopolitical and geostrategic position of the Islamic Republic of Iran

One of the states showing special attention to Azerbaijan in geopolitical interests is the Islamic Republic of Iran. Before the creation of new world order at the end of the 20th century, the Islamic Republic of Iran was of great importance due to its geopolitical and geostrategic position in front of the USSR, one of the main poles of the bipolar world. Despite the fact that after the collapse of the USSR and the loss of Russia of its former power, Iran retained its geopolitical position, the Caucasus region has become increasingly important for the West due to its geostrategic position. The Islamic Republic of Iran occupies one of the leading positions among Islamic countries in terms of the political, economic and military power of Iran. The presence of a connection with the Persian Gulf, the Caspian Sea, the Caucasus, the Indo-Chinese Peninsula, and the Central Asian region increases Iran's geopolitical power. Iran is rich in oil and other natural resources. Iran, which is an Islamic State, claims that its domestic and foreign policy strategy is based on religious values. By transforming Islamic religious values into a state ideology, Iran seeks to realise such strategic goals as maintaining the integrity of the country within the state, forming a common way of thinking, and deepening ties with the Middle East and distant Islamic countries. The presence of all these factors makes it possible to call Iran a geostrategically "active" country. After the Islamic Revolution of 1979, dramatic changes took place in Iran's Foreign Policy Concept. Iran has included in its special interest the regions of the Middle East, Central Asia and the Caucasus. Iran, which bases its foreign policy strategy on religious ideology, prefers anti-American, anti-Achudan, anti-Turkic policies. Iran's geopolitical position brings it closer to Russia.

The Islamic Republic of Iran occupies a special place in the foreign policy of the Azerbaijan state. Ties between the Islamic Republic of Iran and the Republic of Azerbaijan have been mixed at times. Along with friendly relations between the two countries, the cooling of relations very often took place. There has never been an unequivocal attitude towards the state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan in Iran. Official circles of the Islamic Republic of Iran, who viewed Azerbaijan as a threat to state independence, found it difficult to recognise it in the 90s of the 20th century. Despite the fact that many states of the world have already recognised the state independence of Azerbaijan, the Islamic Republic of Iran still hesitated in this regard (Gasimov, 1997).

Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Islamic Republic of Iran A.A. Vilayati, in an interview with the "Voice of Moscow" radio station in November 1991, unambiguously stated: "We do not intend to recognise the independence of Azerbaijan. Our relations with this republic will develop within the framework of the Soviet Union". In subsequent negotiations, the Islamic Republic of Iran did not abandon such statements, and the policy of the southern neighbour in 1990-1991 did not differ significantly from the policy of 1918-1920. However, neither in the 20s, nor in the 90s, the Islamic Republic of Iran was unable to achieve what it wanted and was forced to recognise the state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. After hesitation, on December 25, 1991, Iran, together with the United States, recognised the state independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan, and on March 12, 1992, diplomatic relations were established between the states (Gasimov, 1996).

At that time, the Islamic Republic of Iran was the eleventh state in the world to recognise the independence of the Republic of Azerbaijan. Although both sides show benevolent interest in relations, Iran and Azerbaijan can be described as "good enemies". Both countries have expressed a desire to normalise relations, but tensions between them never subside. On the part of the Islamic Republic of Iran, this tension is always felt. In particular, it demonstrates an irreconcilable position in the patronage of Armenia, the division of the Caspian seabed, and ideological propaganda in the border regions.

The opening by Iran of a corridor in Armenia and the provision of political, economic and static assistance to the country that occupied the lands of the Republic of Azerbaijan up to the borders of the Islamic Republic of Iran irritates the government of Azerbaijan and the Azerbaijani people. In the region where Azerbaijanis live in the Islamic Republic of Iran, there are no secondary schools, cultural centres, or higher schools. But there are 7-8 schools with a population of 200-300 thousand Armenians.

Despite the fact that Iran is a fundamental Islamic state, Islam is used for this state as an ideological weapon. If today Iran does not provide assistance, Armenia will not be able to continue this struggle for more than a year. But Iran does not. The reason is also clear. Most of the Iranian population are Azerbaijani Turks, and they are constantly striving for unity. Their mother tongue violates their rights in relation to schools. For the Iranian state, there is a threat of unification of the lands. It never wanted Azerbaijan to be a strong, mighty state. Iran condemns Azerbaijan for cooperation with the Israeli state in order to cover up its ties, brotherhood with Armenia. First of all, the country cannot be blamed for the fact that it recently gained independence and established relations with some countries.

One of the main regions facing the geopolitical interests of Iran with the West and Turkey is the Caucasus, the Caspian region, in particular Azerbaijan. The geopolitical importance of Azerbaijan for Iran is characterised by the following factors:

- Azerbaijan plays the role of a corridor between the point of exit to the north and the geopolitical axis Moscow-Tehran;
- Azerbaijan is rich in natural resources;
- shares the same religious values as Azerbaijan;
- historical ties, proximity to culture and traditions (Ezhiev, 2005).

Considering all these factors, the Islamic Republic of Iran seeks to realise geopolitical interests in Azerbaijan. Despite the Islamic State, Iran prefers a dual approach towards Azerbaijan. The main reason for this is that about 30 million Azerbaijanis living in the country are not afraid of Turkey's desire to unite with Northern Azerbaijan. From this point of view, Tehran is not interested in strengthening and developing the Azerbaijani state. Therefore, establishing comprehensive ties with Armenia, he uses it as a means of pressure against Azerbaijan and Turkey. This creates the impression that Russia, Armenia and Iran are close in geopolitical positions in the region. From this point of view, Azerbaijan is integrating into Euro-Atlantic structures to achieve a balance in the

region, deepening cooperation with the GUAM states and, finally, developing a strategic alliance with Turkey.

Tehran's non-acceptance of Azerbaijan's foreign policy strategy leads to the emergence of controversial issues between the two countries. One of these controversial issues is Iran's inability to agree with Azerbaijan in determining the legal status of the Caspian. Due to sharp strategic contradictions with the United States, Iran does not recognise the oil contracts concluded by Azerbaijan and the division of the Caspian into sectors. The Islamic Republic of Iran opposes the coming to power of countries outside the Caspian Sea. The Azerbaijani state cannot be recognised as the state due to the fact that such a position of Tehran proceeds from its demand for "regional leadership" and violates the rights of the coastal countries.

With regard to the topic of the Caspian Sea, it can be seen that certain problems still remain unresolved and frozen. Russian researcher Ezhiev believes that in the approach to the status of the Caspian Sea, both positions of Iran were based on two main factors. One of them was to prevent either military-geostrategic or geoeconomic participation of Western countries in the sea, and the other, taking advantage of the prevailing conditions, to strengthen their geopolitical positions in the Caspian Sea, dominate the Muslim countries of the region and as soon as possible oust Russia from this space. As can be seen, Iran thinks about its geopolitical benefits more than about its economic interests. Since the main interest of official Tehran in this issue lies not in recognising the Caspian as a "sea" or "lake", but in ensuring Iran's geostrategic security and preventing "potential threats" emanating from Western countries that have become active in the region. And economic interests for Tehran are at least secondary, because in the Persian Gulf and in other dry regions of the Caspian there are many excellent and rich energy resources, ready-made production infrastructure (Müller, 2008; Noonan, 2015; Smith & Pinder, 1997).

Conclusion

The study demonstrates in detail the mutual geopolitical and geostrategic importance of the state of Azerbaijan and its closest neighbours – the Republic of Turkey and the Islamic Republic of Iran. Turkey's geopolitical power looks very attractive to Azerbaijan. Azerbaijan considers this force to be one of the important instruments for ensuring its security and integration with the West. Turkey's geopolitical capabilities can be characterised by the following factors: its location at the junction of Europe and Asia, joining NATO, the presence of a liberal economic and political system, being surrounded by the sea, a combination of Western and Eastern cultures and the presence of a strong army.

Thus, it can be concluded that along with the separation of two countries of the same ethnic origin, language and culture, geostrategic interests can also be indicated as the main aspects that make the union of Azerbaijan and Turkey natural. The deepening of the strategic alliance between Azerbaijan and Turkey means the growth of the geopolitical power of the Turkic world as a whole, Turkic culture and, finally, the ethnos.

As for the Islamic Republic of Iran, despite serious differences with the southern neighbour in the geopolitical positions of Azerbaijan, the interests of both states and the interests of national security require the development of mutual relations. Iran is interested in the development of both political, economic and cultural ties with Azerbaijan for a number of internal and external factors. At the same time, Azerbaijan attaches great importance to the development of relations with Iran in foreign policy. In particular, cooperation with Iran in the economic sphere meets the geopolitical interests of Azerbaijan. From this point of view, both states successfully cooperate in many areas and do not provide an opportunity for an unlimited cooling of relations.

References

- Akbulaev, N., & Bayramli, G. (2020). Maritime transport and economic growth: Interconnection and influence (an example of the countriesin the Caspian sea coast; Russia, Azerbaijan, Turkmenistan, Kazakhstan and Iran). *Marine Policy*, 118, 104005. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.marpol.2020.104005
- Bilgin, P. (2007). "Only strong states can survive in Turkey's geography": the uses of "geopolitical truths" in Turkey. *Political geography*, 26(7), 740-756. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.04.003
- Britchenko, I., Guliyeva, A., & Rzayeva, U. (2018). Global security and economic asymmetry: a comparison of developed and developing countries.
- Burton, E. K. (2018). Narrating ethnicity and diversity in Middle Eastern national genome projects. *Social studies of science*, 48(5), 762-786.
- De Jong, M., & Warmelink, H. (2017). Oasistan: An intercultural role-playing simulation game to recognize cultural dimensions. *Simulation & Gaming*, 48(2), 178-198
- Ezhiev I.B. (2005). Geopolitical processes in the Caspian region in the 90s of the 20th early 21st century: dissertation abstract for the degree of candidate of political sciences. Moscow: State University of Management, 26 p.
- Gasimov M.D. (1996). Azerbaijan in the system of international relations (1991-1995). Baku: Gyanjlik, 136 p.
- Gasimov M.D. (1997). Foreign policy of Azerbaijan (conceptual issues). Baku: Gyanjlik, 86 p.
- Gylfason, T. (2001). Natural resources, education, and economic development. *European economic review*, 45(4-6), 847-859. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0014-2921(01)00127-1
- Hendriarto, P. (2021). Understanding of the role of digitalization to business model and innovation: economics and business review studies. *Linguistics and Culture Review*, 5(S1), 160-173.
- Ibegbulem, H. O. (2021). The language of indemnification and the economic growth of Nigeria: perspectives from assurance firms. *Linguistics and Culture Review*, 5(S3), 41-54.
- Ibrayeva, A. (2018). Importance of the Caspian countries for the European Union energy security.
- Ibrayeva, A., Tashtemkhanova, R., Ospanova, A., Somzhurek, B., & Azmukhanova, A. (2017). Energy export potential in the Caspian region and its impact on EU energy security. *Periodica Polytechnica Social and Management Sciences*, 25(2), 127-140.
- Ilhan, S. (2000). Why No to the European Union: The Geopolitical Approach.

- Kolosov, V. A., & Mironenko, N. S. (2001). Geopolitika i politicheskaya geo-grafiya [Geopolitics and political geography], Moscow, 479 p.
- Koo, G. Y., & Han, H. E. (2018). To veil or not to veil: Turkish and Iranian hijab policies and the struggle for recognition. *Asian Journal of Women's Studies*, 24(1), 47-70.
- Le Billon, P. (2001). The political ecology of war: natural resources and armed conflicts. *Political geography*, 20(5), 561-584. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0962-6298(01)00015-4
- Monshipouri, M. (2017). Pipeline politics in Iran, turkey, and the south caucasus. The great game in west asia: Iran, turkey and the south Caucasus, (pp. 57-81).
- Morozov, I. V. (2018). Prospects for the development of the oil and gas industry in the regional and global economy.
- Müller, M. (2008). Reconsidering the concept of discourse for the field of critical geopolitics: Towards discourse as language and practice. *Political geography*, 27(3), 322-338. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.polgeo.2007.12.003
- Noonan, M. P. (2015). American geostrategy in a disordered world. *Orbis*, 59(4), 600-612. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.orbis.2015.08.005
- Orazgaliyev, S., & Araral, E. (2019). Conflict and cooperation in global commons: Theory and evidence from the Caspian Sea. *International Journal of the Commons*, 13(2).
- Rozin, M. D., Ryabtsev, V. N., Svechkarev, V. P., & Suschiy, S. Y. (2017). The black and caspian sea region as a field of The Great Game (Political and geographical realities of the post-Soviet period). *Man In India*, 97(23), 449-459.
- Slack, B., & Starr, J. (1997). Geostrategy, resources and geopolitics: implications for the US Navy and naval port system. *Marine Policy*, 21(4), 309-323. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(97)00011-0
- Smith, H. D., & Pinder, D. (1997). Geostrategy and naval port systems: frameworks for analysis. *Marine Policy*, 21(4), 291-308. https://doi.org/10.1016/S0308-597X(97)00026-2
- Tavana, M., Pirdashti, M., Kennedy, D. T., Belaud, J. P., & Behzadian, M. (2012). A hybrid Delphi-SWOT paradigm for oil and gas pipeline strategic planning in Caspian Sea basin. *Energy Policy*, 40, 345-360. https://doi.org/10.1016/j.enpol.2011.10.020
- Tuathail, G. Ó., & Agnew, J. (1992). Geopolitics and discourse: practical geopolitical reasoning in American foreign policy. *Political geography*, 11(2), 190-204. https://doi.org/10.1016/0962-6298(92)90048-X